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ABSTRACT 
For some, the transnationalisation of political action and communicative space in the 
EU heralds an emergent cosmopolitan order. Need that be so? There are supranational 
institutions in the EU as well as transnational political and cultural spaces and cross-
border communicative flows. However, the Union’s member states remain key 
controllers of citizenship rights and purveyors of collective identities.  And for many 
purposes they still maintain strongly bounded national public spheres. Because the 
EU’s overall character as a polity remains unresolved this has consequences for the 
organisation of communicative spaces. The EU is a field of tensions and 
contradictions that is inescapably rooted in institutional realities. Wishful thinking 
about cosmopolitanism can get in the way of clear analysis. 
 
Keywords: cosmopolitanism; European Union; collective identity; nation; public 
sphere; state 
 
Introductioni  
This essay considers the extent to which the development of the European Union has 
opened up the prospects of a European public sphere and a new cosmopolitanism.  
 
The EU is a regional bloc of 27 European states, each with distinctive political, 
bureaucratic and judicial institutions. What makes the Union so interesting for social 
and political theory - as well as for empirical research into communication and culture 
- is that it is a unique experiment because it is a regional economic formation with a 
developed political superstructure. Its uniqueness lies both in its scale and the 
recurrently articulated ambition in some political quarters of the Union to create a 
federal political entity. 
 
The theoretical challenge for thinking about the public sphere lies both in the EU’s 
unusual status as a polity and in its unresolved nature – its ambiguities, its liminality. 
The Union is a supranational entity caught between two models – on the one hand, 
intergovernmental cooperation and on the other, a possible federalism. At present, it 
operates as a regulatory regime for its member states. Its ultimate federal vocation 
remains uncertain. In April 2007, the former German foreign minister, Joschke 
Fischer, pointed to the EU’s present lack of legitimacy and stasis over institutional 
reform and cautioned against possible melt down. At this time of writing (June 2007) 
the German Presidency of the EU under Chancellor Angela Merkel is attempting to 
address the constitutional deadlock. The impasse came about in June 2005 when, in 
referenda held in both their states, the French and Dutch electorates rejected the 
process of ratifying a Constitutional Treaty for the EU.  
 
Why be concerned about the effort to produce a constitution? One key reason is that 
the developing Euro-polity has stretched received concepts of statehood and extended 
notions of citizenship and identity – however gingerly - beyond the nation-state. The 
full engagement of citizens in a European public sphere (or, much more probable, in 
an interconnected sphere of publics) would change the present balance of 
relationships between the Union and the member states. Common action in a common 
space (or interlinked spaces) would have consequences for conceptions of collective 
belonging to the body politic.  
 
Of course, this perspective is open to dispute, as from a theoretical point of view the 
EU is a screen on which different normative models are continually projected. It 
follows that the significance of much empirical work including that on the role of 
media and communication in contributing to the possible construction of a European 
public sphere - is open to diverse interpretations. 
 
A new cosmopolitanism? 
The Union’s present trajectory has engaged major social theorists such as Ulrich 
Beck, Manuel Castells, and Jürgen Habermas. All – in different ways – have signalled 
the EU’s cosmopolitan potential. Beck (2006: 3), for instance, has defined the 
cosmopolitan outlook as comprising a: 
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‘[g]lobal sense, a sense of boundarylessness. An everyday, historically alert, reflexive 
awareness of ambivalences in a milieu of blurring differentiations and cultural 
contradictions. It reveals…the possibility of shaping one’s life under conditions of 
cultural mixture…’  
 
While in this conception Beck signals the general importance of ambivalence for a 
cosmopolitan Weltanschauung, in the case of Europe he is far too ready to try and 
resolve the contradictions.  It is understandable that the creation and elaboration of a 
supranational political formation encourages reflections both on post-nationalism and 
transnationalism. However, there is a crucial difference between developing a critical 
awareness of the unconventional nature of the EU as a polity and seeing the Union as 
necessarily becoming a nascent cosmopolitan space that allows an escape from the 
prison-house of nationalism. 
 
The ‘cosmopolitan temptation’ of my title, therefore, concerns the detectable desire to 
over-read the EU’s post-nationalist possibilities. We cannot deny that far-reaching 
new relations, which might transform the national instance, could emerge as the 
Union develops. Although the political imagination can and should be deployed to 
envisage a future good society it is dangerous to cast off the moorings of an analytical 
intelligence that pays careful attention to developments on the ground. To be sure, the 
cosmopolitan alternative is tempting, given the huge destructiveness of the dark side 
of nationalism in Europe during the twentieth century and continuing ethno-national 
struggles in the twenty-first. But acts of will cannot abolish the continuing 
significance of the national dimension. 
 
We need to discipline our reflections about the possibility of cosmopolitanism by 
showing due analytical respect for the continued existence of the state system and the 
historico-cultural weight of the nation in thinking about the future of the public sphere 
in Europe.  
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Communicative space 
The idea of communicative space is central to how we think about the workings of the 
contemporary political public sphere. When used in this context, the spatial metaphor 
designates what must, in the end, be a bounded figure whose internal and external 
relations are in each case subject to a specific range of determinations. A public 
sphere is typically conceived as a domain constituted for the exercise of critical 
judgement, where writing, publishing, visualising, talking, listening and deliberating 
are means of engagement in matters of public interest. In the era of the modern state, 
the principal space of political communication has commonly been equated with the 
territorial limits of a national community. In Ernest Gellner’s (1983) phrase, the state 
provides the ‘political roof’ for a national culture. The mediated discourses of 
political actors have a key role in giving shape and texture to the public sphere.  
Slavko Splichal (2006) has noted that the Kantian principle of publicity makes a 
universal claim that necessarily extends beyond a national or indeed, a European, 
political framework. In line with this, for cosmopolitans, public communicative space 
is precisely potentially global in scope. Consequently, states have become relativised 
as communicative spaces and containers of political action. However, it remains 
important to note that states have not been transcended as the principal controllers of 
citizenship, the  purveyors of key collective identities, or the deliverers of a myriad of 
services and demands that shape the everyday lives and experiences of their 
inhabitants.  
 
Thus, when it comes to conceptualising the public sphere, two broad perspectives  – 
the statist and the global - are now the grand polar variants in play. This dualistic 
characterisation may simplify and dramatise; but it does offer us a clear entry-point 
into arguments about the EU.  
 
If ‘the state’ and ‘the globe’ describe distinct conceptions of political space, polities 
that are neither clearly the one nor the other offer a particular challenge to such 
categorisation. In a binary conceptual framework, their ambiguity simply cannot be 
resolved. The European Union is in this sense a conceptual anomaly. Less all 
embracing than the globe, it is also much more territorially far-reaching than the state.  
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And it is precisely this ambiguous figuration that makes it so open to a cosmopolitan 
temptation. 
 
As the political scope of national communicative communities in the EU is no longer 
completely defined by the member states’ boundaries, to analyse emergent European 
communicative spaces, we need to shift our focus to the supranational arenas centred 
on Brussels and consider how these work for their constituent publics.  
 
Is the European public sphere manageable? 
How are we to think of ‘publicness’ in the multi-level complexity of the EU? Both 
national and ‘European’ discourses and institutions co-exist. The EU’s policy making 
is a major constitutive part of member states’ domestic political agendas and also of 
their legal and economic frameworks. Yet for most citizens the Union is still another 
place, a different political level and an external locus of decision-making more than it 
is an internal one. Political scientists’ label for the widespread public alienation from 
the EU is the ‘democratic deficit’. And there is now growing official recognition that 
this is accompanied by a ‘communication deficit’. 
 
Unease at the top was signalled by the European Commission’s (2006) White Paper on 
Communication Policy. The Commission envisaged engaging recalcitrant publics via a 
‘partnership’ encompassing ‘civil society’ across the member states. This entails an 
implicit theory not only of political communication but also of social communication. 
Civil society is only in part to be conceived as operating in the political domain. It is 
also a socio-cultural hinterland and a realm of everyday life.  The territory of social 
communication encompasses ‘thick’ social relations. To some extent this concerns the 
official world of political and other institutions. But more significant, perhaps, are our 
everyday attachments to localities, workplaces, associations, our shared tastes and 
pleasures, the familiar and the engaging. It is our routine situatedness that produces a 
sense of belonging and the emotional attachments that are still part of national life in 
European states. As contemporary debate about the future of multiculturalism amply 
testifies, the national public sphere is the terrain of considerable conflict. What matters 
for present purposes, however, is that rather than identify an emergent Europeanism 
with cosmopolitan potential, the EC’s proposed approach to citizen mobilisation has 
gone with the grain of the nation and the state. 
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In fact, unbeknown to its progenitors, this social communications approach has at 
least a century-old pedigree. At the turn of the 1900s, the Austro-Marxist theorist, 
Otto Bauer (2000), wished to entrench national cultural autonomy in the multinational 
Habsburg empire. He conceived of the nation as linguistically and culturally self-
contained, or at the very least, as tending towards communicative closure. But it could 
not be an autarchic space because it also operated within the wider political formation 
of imperial Austria-Hungary. This was an early statement of a social communication 
theory of the nation that has left its conceptual imprint on how contemporary theories 
of nationalism address the public sphere.  
Take Karl Deutsch (1966: 19-20), an early theorist of European union influenced by 
Otto Bauer, who argued that nations and nation-states are strongly bounded by their 
patterns of interaction. To put it differently, social communication produces collective 
cohesion and identity – and invites us to share in a common fate.  
This simple – but compelling - idea is reproduced in a number of influential theories 
of nationalism. In practice, Ernest Gellner’s (1983: 37-38) view that culture is ‘the 
distinctive style of conduct and communication of a given community’ and that it is 
‘now the necessary shared medium’ of the nation is, at root, a social communications 
theory of cohesion. For Gellner, the national education system is the key agency that 
diffuses a literate ‘high culture’. Media are seen as sustaining the political community, 
as providing it with its deep codes for distinguishing between ‘us’ and ‘them’.  
Similarly, Benedict Anderson (1991) has contended that the collective consumption 
of mediated communication (based on a common ‘national’ language) creates and 
sustains a sense of common belonging. Michael Billig (1995) has also endorsed and 
extended this broad social communications viewpoint. As nationals, he suggests, we 
live less in a state of perpetual mobilisation than one of the banal assimilation of 
everyday symbolism and categorisation.  
This variant of social communications theory is much challenged today when – 
precisely under conditions of multiculturalism - it is hardly so clear that all citizens’ 
cultural boundaries are defined by national public spaces. Moreover, all national 
systems of communication are influenced by what lies outside. National cultures are 
usually permeable, even when censored and controlled, and in the age of the Internet, 
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mobile communications, social networking, and satellite broadcasting, such relative 
openness is necessarily greater than ever before.  
 
Recognising this, contemporary cosmopolitans reverse the terms of the old Austro-
Marxist conundrum. In his time, Otto Bauer tried to address nationalist demands from 
within the overarching framework of a multinational state. His problem was how to 
ensure more play for national culture within the carapace of the existing supranational 
state - in order to head off separatism at the pass. Current cosmopolitan writers, 
however, would wish to leave the as yet incomplete EU behind. Instead of playing 
within the boundaries, they emphasise the transcendent potential of the emergent 
European framework, the capacity to connect to a new global order that needs a 
public sphere to match.  
 
But there are some obvious obstacles to the creation of a general European public 
sphere, whose installation could indeed be a major step on the cosmopolitan road. For 
instance, there is considerable linguistic diversity in the EU (currently, 23 official 
languages) and a fragmented intelligentsia (still largely bound to national cultural 
systems). As has been amply documented, the language question in Europe has 
generated both complex policies and baroque politics (Castiglione and Longman (eds) 
2007). True, English is emerging as an unofficial lingua franca. But arguably that 
process principally addresses functional needs rather than building a collective 
identity.  
 
The EU’s actually existing cultural complexity is far-reaching. Indigenous regional or 
minority languages, often with supporting institutions and media systems, operate at a 
sub-state level, where particular publics are constituted on the basis of linguistic or 
cultural distinctiveness. Besides, continuing migration and diasporic links have 
ensured that, as elsewhere, further linguistic and cultural diversity – partly sustained 
by transnational media consumption - are part and parcel of the contemporary 
landscape of the member states. The politics of language and its relationship to media 
is central to this discussion (Cormack and Hourigan (eds), 2007; Jouët and Pasquier, 
(eds), 2001; Moragas Spà et al. (eds), 1999). 
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To recognise such internal diversity as inescapable is one possible move; another is to 
try and close the EU’s door to further difference. Both of these involve strategies of 
political management. How ‘unity in diversity’ (aka minimal cohesion) is conceived 
will differ in respect of the stance taken towards new migration and existing 
multiculturalism.  
 
Currently, debates about national belonging have centred particularly (although 
certainly not exclusively) on the Muslim presence in EU states. Alongside episodic 
media coverage of various forms of female Muslim attire, the high point of resonance 
came during the so-called Mohammed cartoons affair in 2005. Muslim religio-cultural 
identities have become enmeshed in contemporary struggles over post-Enlightenment 
secularism, where the battleground has also brought Christians and humanists into 
collision.  
 
It is not surprising in a political formation such as the EU that national conflicts also 
resonate on the European plane.  In the EU Constitutional Convention’s debates (from 
2002-2004), there was extensive discussion of whether or not the Union should 
underline its Christian spiritual heritage as an integral part of its identity. The ensuing 
reactions showed that this project was of concern to Europe’s non-Christian 
minorities and to humanists.  
 
It is a particularly moot question, given proposed Turkish accession to the EU. Other 
states on the European continent are waiting to join the club. Most are post-
communist. However, that is not the case for Turkey, formally a secular state with a 
largely Muslim population. Turkey’s continued secularism is, at present, an object of 
acute political struggle. The country’s long-standing efforts to accede to the EU have 
focused renewed attention on the quite far-reaching divisions over what is meant by a 
‘European’ identity. The enlargement of the Union eastwards has reinforced the lobby 
that wants to emphasise Europe’s Christian heritage and embed that collective identity 
in a future EU constitutional treaty. One such attempt has already been made and 
there is no reason to think that this line of argument is passé in the discursive politics 
of EU boundaries and identities (Schlesinger and Foret, 2006). 
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Ulrich Beck has described the identification of Europeanness with a particular 
religious heritage as a retrograde exclusionary tactic.  But it plainly will not go away 
and has been raised with regularity by various EU politicians and in March 2007 by 
Pope Benedict XVI.  
 
Do political institutions matter? 
The debate over spiritual values and religious heritage shows that we can’t escape 
from politics, high or low. That means we do have to take the EU’s institutions 
seriously. On this score, cosmopolitans divide into two main camps: institutional and 
post-institutional. 
 
Institutional cosmopolitans use the language of rights and duties. Habermas’s rights-
based, supranational conception of the EU connects to a global perspective. He 
portrays the public sphere as potentially unbounded, as shifting from specific locales 
(such as the nation) to the virtual co-presence of citizens linked by public media. 
Habermas (1996: 373-374) argues that communicative space is to be understood in 
terms of ‘a highly complex network…[that] branches out into a multitude of 
overlapping international, national, regional, local and subcultural arenas’.   
 
A European public sphere, therefore, would be open-ended, with communicative 
connections extending well beyond the continent. But what this leaves unresolved is 
whether or not convergent communicative practices might produce some kind of 
cultural cohesion, resulting - to use Bauer’s phrase  - in a European ‘community of 
fate’.  
 
Habermas’s response is to propose that EU citizens become ‘constitutional patriots’. 
This post-nationalist, rule-based form of identification implies an order of preference 
and at least some distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. It  carries inescapable echoes of 
an older, interstate, conception of political order. If a social communications approach 
to the public sphere insists on the ‘thickness’ of the values and practices that sustain 
the political culture, constitutional patriotism presumes ‘thin’ relations. However, it 
does also necessarily presuppose certain affinities with other patriots if only, say, in a 
common belief in the importance of the rules of the game. So, the EU’s cosmopolitan 
potential is still anchored in a web of affiliations. 
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 That is why Habermas emphasises the importance of a European constitution. This 
demarcates a distinctive political space and provides ‘a common value orientation’. 
Constitutionalism remains central to how a European public sphere might be 
imagined: linked upwards to more general structures of governance and downwards to 
more particular ones.  
 
Habermas (2004: 27-28) sees the  ‘constitutive process [as]… a unique instrument of 
cross-border communication’. He stresses the key role of a ‘Europe-wide public 
sphere of political communication’ and ‘the creation of a political culture that can be 
shared by all EU citizens’. Today, we might question whether the constitutional 
process – which ended in the 2005 debacle - was really an effective form of 
transnational communication. More striking was the national framing of the debate 
and how national considerations played into rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 
France and the Netherlands.  
 
Habermas’s attempt to navigate between the free flight of cosmopolitan potential and 
gravitational pull of institutions is akin to Manuel Castells’ (1998) approach. Castells 
sees the EU as a precursor to a new political order, to new forms of association and 
loyalty: the emerging Euro-polity epitomises what he calls ‘the network state’. The 
EU is imagined not only as a political-economic zone but also as a specific kind of 
communicative space. Castells focuses on how networks, facilitated by 
communications technologies, transcend borders.  
 
He argues that the EU has different ‘nodes’ of varying importance that together make 
up a network. Regions and nations, nation-states, European Union institutions, 
together constitute a framework of shared authority. They define the boundaries of the 
putative European communicative space – and therefore the potential public sphere 
(Castells 1998: 330-331).  
 
This approach implies that what Karl Deutsch once called ‘communicative 
complementarities’ can emerge out of the informal processes of making the Union. 
The globalising pull of communications technologies is countered by emergent 
patterns of social interaction in the European Union’s space. Cosmopolitans are 
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challenged to recognise the varying significance of particular fora (or public spheres) 
within such a network model.  
 
Let us put the institutional cosmopolitan position in context. Over time, we may 
agree, the EU has developed a special interactive intensity that, in some sectors of 
public life, favours internal communication and creates an internally differentiated 
referential boundary, with stronger and weaker forms of institutionalisation. This 
may, and does, co-exist with global networking and the development of transnational 
governance. As a counterweight to cosmopolitan potential, however, in the present 
intergovernmental model national public spheres remain central to political life. There 
are indeed also transnational spaces of communication. But there are particular rather 
than general: political and economic elites and expert communities (including 
academics, by the way) tend to dominate these. 
 
For Ulrich Beck (2006: 164), the EU’s struggle with its political future is actually an 
‘institutionalized failure of the imagination’ that does not live up the cosmopolitan 
dreams of its founding fathers. The Union, he maintains, lacks political pragmatism 
and radical openness. The present tensions between the regulatory and federal models, 
which are actually of vital explanatory importance, are swept aside by Beck (rather 
oddly) as denying Europe’s diversity (2006: 171-172). Instead, Beck (2006: 167) 
argues, ‘The political union must be conceived as a cosmopolitan union of Europe, in 
opposition to the false normativity of the national’. The prospect held out is variously 
that of a ‘cosmopolitan state’ or a ‘cosmopolitan cooperative of states’. But beyond 
these slogans it is not clear how power would actually be exercised, how post-
territorial politics would function or how support for tolerant ethno-cultural diversity 
might be secured. There is certainly little realistic engagement with institutional 
politics. 
 
For instance, according to Beck, the EU has inaugurated ‘a struggle over institutions 
with the aim of confronting European horror with European values and methods’. 
After World War II and the Holocaust, he believes, one of Europe’s most positive 
achievements is to stand for the protection of human rights. He further asserts that 
commemoration of the Holocaust is an institutional foundation for the EU’s identity 
and indeed for a wider Europe. However, Beck’s position takes no account of 
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Holocaust denial, or how opposition to acts of commemoration is now connected to 
the politics of the Middle East, or of the differences between official acts and popular 
sentiment, or of the present-day competition over post World War II victimhood 
throughout Europe.  
 
Gerard Delanty has taken a more radical post-institutional line  (Delanty and Rumford 
2005: 20), seeing Europe mainly as a space of possibilities for new cosmopolitan 
attachments, where the challenge for the EU is to ‘create spaces for communication’ 
(2005: 68).  
 
Communication is judged to be valuable principally in articulating connections beyond 
the EU, rather than in building it into a political community or a collective identity. 
From this point of view, the European public sphere is not so much an institutionalised 
space that might democratise the Union – or deal with Europe’s past – as a post-
institutional launching pad for a new orientation to the world that increasingly sheds 
its European cast. 
 
Europeanised political communication? 
Such unresolved tensions in social and political theory are also reflected in current 
debate about political communication and the public sphere in Europe. Because EU 
policymaking impinges increasingly on member states, it also impacts more and more 
on the agenda of the mediated political discourse of national polities. How should we 
interpret this?  
 
The central issue is the extent to which political communication may be judged to 
have a formative impact on citizenship, collective identity and patriotism, shifting 
these from their longstanding and often exclusive alignment with the member states 
(and nations) into a more inclusive ‘European’ citizenship, collective identity and 
constitutional patriotism.  
 
The dividing line is over whether mediated communication is now leading to the 
creation of a European public sphere. What that means is itself a matter of debate. Is a 
European communicative space to be conceived as a single, general public sphere on 
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the model of the nation-state? Or, given Europe’s complexity, is this better conceived 
as constituted by overlapping spheres of publics?  
 
Some – Klaus Eder, for instance – have argued argue for a kind of spill-over effect, in 
which the dissemination of argument and diverse perspectives across national borders 
stimulates a wider, European level of political engagement through a collective 
learning process (Eder 2007; Trenz and Eder, 2004). However, we might note 
pertinently that hopes placed in the educative content of the constitutional debate have 
not so far been realised. 
  
In this connection, it is surely time to revise assumptions about the capacity of elite 
media, or of public service broadcasting, to operate collectively across the member 
states as instruments of enlightenment. Broadcasting systems are increasingly 
fragmenting under the pressures of economic competition and digital convergence. 
Newspapers are making a complex accommodation to the Internet as they work out 
new business models. Indeed, increasingly, the evolution of the Internet has posed 
new questions about the conditions under which traditional media reporting might 
evolve. For political classes everywhere, the challenge of credibly addressing general 
publics by way of generally accessible media is only likely to grow and is being made 
increasingly difficult by a generational shift in media consumption patterns among the 
young. Splichal (2006: 703) rightly questions the negative impact of such trends on 
‘media democratization’. 
 
While media in the EU may address similar issues at the same time in different 
member states, this does not necessarily equate to the widespread distribution of a 
shared European perspective. And even if the distribution of media content were 
uniform that would not stop it from being diversely interpreted. In the member states, 
national editorial values continue to shape reporting and commentary on European 
themes (Kevin 2003: 179). Even at key constitutional moments, coverage is framed 
principally in terms of national politics (Gleissner and de Vreese, 2005). 
 
Consequently, if news agendas have become to a lesser or greater extent 
‘Europeanised’ across the EU, for national publics this has not so far been translated 
into an irresistible invitation to become European. The continuing national pull of 
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journalistic practice and frameworks of reference explains the sheer difficulty of 
developing journalism for a Europe-wide general public. What pertains at the popular 
level also affects intellectual elites. No doubt, these now interact more as a result of 
EU-wide networking, encouraged and enabled by the Union’s institutions as well as 
by other Europe-wide bodies. However, as Abram de Swaan (2007) notes, this does 
not, as yet, add up to the formation of a European intelligentsia with its supporting 
cultural panoply.  
 
Can the mediated public sphere and a convergent news agenda significantly  
‘Europeanise’ the EU’s constituent national publics in the long term? This might 
happen, but only – it would seem - given numerous ancillary conditions such as a 
common pan-European politics, a common foreign and defence policy, widely shared 
linguistic and cultural competences, and so forth. In short, by taking major steps 
towards federalism.  
 
A final word 
The development of a European public sphere is ultimately based in the interaction 
between EU-institutions and the transnational networks that institutional development 
has bred. Not all institutions have the same centrality; not all networks have the same 
intensity of interaction. A relatively weak, transnational public space has indeed 
evolved around policy-making actors in the EU institutions. But this does not 
constitute a general European public sphere. Nor indeed, does it yet constitute 
something much less cohesive, namely a European sphere of general publics. 
 
In fact, states, nations and regions remain crucially important as locales for debate and 
as sources of identity. Europeanisation is itself a profoundly ambiguous process. Who 
now – and who in the future - will be permitted to be a ‘European’ is an increasingly 
intense focus for struggles between inclusion and exclusion both within member 
states and at the borders of the EU itself. Because Europeanisation is a boundary-
defining process as well as a transnationalising one, it does not of itself necessarily 
point to a cosmopolitan outcome. 
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